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Table 2 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: single individuals

From: Own-wage labor supply elasticities: variation across time and estimation methods

       Wage elast. Income
Country Authors Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit Hours Particip. Elast.
Belgium Dagsvik et al. (2011) National Register Data, 2002, working age, SW D Polynomial MIMOSI .13 .07  
   SM     .2 .11  
Finland Bargain and Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.18,.34] [.18,.33]  
France Bargain and Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/1995), aged 25–49, SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.08,.14] [.04,.07]  
  Laroque and Salanie (2002) LFS-tax return matched dataset (1999), women aged 25–49, no civil servants, SW D Participation (and full/part-time) model, simultaneous wage and labor supply estimation, probability of unemployment, min. wage Own calc.   .36  
Germany Bargain and Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.09,.18] [.08,.15]  
  Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2003), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.20,.36] [.05,.09]  
  Haan and Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.02,.24] [.01,.10]  
   SM     [.08,.31] [.04,.28]  
  Clauss and Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/2005), aged 20–65, SW D TU + PTD STSM .38 .18  
   SM     .23 .17  
  Haan and Uhlendorff (2007) SOEP (2000-2005), age 25–59, SM D Reduced form risk model; non-parametric random coefficient STSM [.016,.036] [.05,.12]  
  Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, SW D TU + PTD FiFoSiM .28 .13  
   SM     .28 .17  
  Bargain et al. (2010) SOEP (2003), working age, SW D/H QU + PTD; involuntary unemployment STSM [.06,.16] [.04,.10]  
   SM     [.10,.20] [.05,.12]  
Italy Aaberge et al. (2002) Survey on Household Income and Wealth (1993), SW A GU Own calc. .10 .06  
   SM     .11 .08  
Netherlands Euwals and Van Soest (1999) Dutch SOEP (1988), actual and desired hours, SW D TU + FC, R Own calc. [.03,.45]   
   SM     [.03,.18]   
  Mastrogiacomo et al. (2013) Labour Market Panel, 1999–2005, SW D QU, FC CPB Model [.04,.62] [.01,.43]  
   SM     [.14,.45] [.09,.32]  
Norway Aaberge and Colombino (2012) Survey of Income and Wealth (1994/1995); SW D Polynomial Statistic Norway model −.09 .12  
   SM     −.02 .04  
Sweden Andrén (2003) HINK (1997–1998), SP D QU + FC; simulat. with W and CC Own calc. [.55,.87] .50 −.1
  Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, IDS, 1999, SP D TU, R FASIT .51 .35  
UK Walker (1990) FES (1979–1984), SP D Participation model Benefits only   .70  
  Ermisch and Wright (1991) General household survey (1973–1982), SP D Participation model, demand-side controls Simplified system   1.7  
  Jenkins (1992) Lone parents survey (1989), SP D + H Two positive hour choices, unemployment risk, FC Benefits only   1.8  
  Blundell et al. (1992) FES (1981–1986), SP C Marginal rate of substitution function, endogenous wage and income Taxation only   .34  
  Brewer et al. (2006) FES (1995–2002), aged <60, SP D QU + FC, joint with W and CC, R TAXBEN   1.02  
  1. Data and selection: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS); Selection: single women (SW), single men (SM), single parents/mothers (SP). Model: C = continuous LS (Hausman 1981type); T = tobit model; D = discrete model (van Soest 1995type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities vary across individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment). Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL), or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU), or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random preferences (R); fixed costs (FC); welfare participation (W); childcare costs (CC). Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); non-convexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known. Elasticities: brackets indicate the range obtained in function of the specification at use or the confidence interval when available. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in employment rate in percentage points