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Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples

From: Own-wage labor supply elasticities: variation across time and estimation methods

       Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Country Authors Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit Hours Particip. Hours Particip. Female Male
Austria Dearing et al. (2007) SILC (2004), at least 1 child aged <10 D QU; M ITABENA   [.07,.19]b     
Belgium Orsini (2007, 2012) Panel Survey of Belgian Households (2000–2001), working age D QU and GU + PTD; J MODETE [.16,.31] [.10,.19] [.10,.18] [.08,.15]   
  Dagsvik et al. (2011) National Register Data (2002), working age D Polynomial MIMOSI .44 .21 .31 .18   
Denmark Smith (1995) Administrative register data (1980–1986) C SL PL .061   .093   0 −.025
  Frederiksen et al. (2008) Survey by Statistics Denmark (1996), age 18–59 C SL, FC PL .148   .05   −.007 −.006
Finland Kuismainen (1997) LFS (1989), survey and tax register; 25–60 C SL, R PL [0,.06]     [.11,.27]  
  Bargain and Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), working age, men all employed D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.10,.18] [.10,.17]a     
France Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) LFS (1985), couples aged 18–60 C/T LL + R; M or J PL, D 1 (.05 with FC)   .10   −.03 (−.02 with FC)/ −.11a −.07
  Laroque and Salanie (2002) Matched LFS-tax returns (1999), women aged 25–49 D Joint particip. and wage; unempl. and min. wage Own calc.   (.96)     
  Choné et al. (2003) Matched LFS-tax returns (1997), working age, children aged <6 D QU, joint wage and CC; min. wage Own calc. 1.05 [.8,.9]b    −.19 / −.18a  
  Bargain and Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/5), working age women, men all employed D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.52,.65] [.46,.58]a     
  Donni and Moreau (2007) HBS (2001), aged 20–60, all employed, no children aged <3 C QL; s-conditional collective LS No taxation [.24,.59]     [ −.35, −.06]  
Germany Kaiser et al. (1992) SOEP (1983), working age C LL C, NC, D 1.04   −.04   −.18 −.28
  Bonin et al. (2002) SOEP (2000), working age, W and E D TL + PTD; J IZAmod .27 .20 .21 .19 .15/.09 .01/ 0
  Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W and E D TU + PTD; J STSM [.16,.55]b [.07,.21]b [.11,.38]b [.07,.23]b   
  Haan and Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W and E, one- or two-earner couples D TU + PTD; J STSM [.08,.56] [.04,.20] [.08,.46] [.07,.26]   
  Bargain and Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), working age, men all employed, W and E D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.31,.45] [.27,.38]a     
  Haan (2006) SOEP (2001), W and E; married couples, 20–65 years D TU STSM [.34,.39] [.13,.14] [.19,.22] [.12,.14]   
  Clauss and Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/2005), couples aged 20–65 D TU; J STSM .37 .14 .24 .16   
  Wrohlich (2006) SOEP (2002), working age, W and E D TU; J; CC STSM [.14,.53]b [.06,.16]b     
  Dearing et al. (2007) SOEP (2004), at least 1 child aged <10, W D QU; M STSM   [.13,.24]b     
  Bargain et al. (2010) SOEP (2003), working age, potential one- or two-earner D/H QU + PTD, R; J STSM [.19,.34] [.08,.20] [.05,.08] [.04,.13]   
  Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, W and E, potential one- or two-earner D TU+PTD;J FiFoSiM .38 .15 .20 .14   
Ireland Callan and van Soest (1996) IDS (1987), desired hours D/H TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.50,.85] .31/.20a [.10,.20]    
  Callan et al. (2009) Living in Ireland Survey (1995), desired hours D TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.71,.90] .49 [.21,.31] .20/.21a   
Italy Colombino and del Boca (1990) Turin Survey of Couples (1979), working age C LL PL 1.18 .64    .52  
  Aaberge et al. (1999) Survey of Income and Wealth (1987), aged 20–70 A Non-linear hours, exog. wage and unearned inc. Own calc. .74 .65 .053 .046 −.014 −.003
  Aaberge et al. (2002, 2004) Survey of Income and Wealth (1993) A GU; J Own calc. .66 .51 .12 .02   
Netherlands van Soest et al. (1990) Labor mobility survey (1985), working age C/D LL, R; discrete wage-hours combinations PL [.35,.59] .12 [.15,.19]   −.23 −.01
  van Soest (1995) SOEP (1987) D TU + PTD, R; J Own calc. [.42,.54]   [.05,.09]   .008 −.03
  van Soest and Das (2001) SOEP (1995), aged 16–64, desired hours D TU + FC, R; J Own calc. [.67,.74]   [.07,.10]    
  van Soest et al. (2002) Dutch SOEP (1995), aged 16–64, desired hours D QU (+ more flexible) + FC, R; simult. wage estimation, J Own calc. [.83, 1.36] [.35,.58]a     
  Bloemen (2009) SEP (1990–2001), couples w/o children, age 22–60 D QL Own [.22,.61]   [.24,.61]   −.057  
  Bloemen (2010) SEP (1990–2002), couples w/o children, age 22–60 D QU, FC Own [.14,.31]   [ −.02,.03]    
  Mastrogiacomo et al. (2013) Labour Market Panel (1999–2005) D QU, FC CPB model [.22,.52] [.17,.40] [.05,.19] [.05,.16]   
Norway Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) Survey of Income and Wealth (1994/1995); married couples D Polynomial Statistic Norway model .65 .28     
  Aaberge and Colombino (2012) Survey of Income and Wealth (1994/1995); married couples D Polynomial Statistic Norway model .21 .31 .23 .16   
Spain García and Suárez (2003) ECHP (1994–1995), aged 16–65, obs. and desired hours C LL Taxes .37 1.51a    −.06  
  Fernández-Val (2003) ECHP (1994–1999), aged <65 and in work C Unitary/collective model No taxation .31      
  Crespo (2006) ECHP (1994–1999), aged <65 and in work C QL, unitary/collective No taxation .14   .01    
  Labeaga et al. (2008) ECHP (1995), working age D QU + FC; J GLAD- HISPANIA .29 .26 .01 .11   
Sweden Blomquist (1983) Level of Living Survey (1974), all employed, aged 25–55 C LL, R PL    .008    −.03
  Flood and MaCurdy (1992) Household Market-Nonmarket Survey (1983), all employed, 25–65 C LL and SL, R PL, D    [ −.25,.21]    [ −.01,.04]
  Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) Level of Living Survey (1981), all employed, aged 25–55 C LL and QL, R PL, C and NC [.38,.77]   [.08,.13]   [ −.24, −.03]  
  Blomquist and Newey (2002) Level of Living Survey (1973, 1980, 1990), all employed, aged 18–60 C Non-parametric labor supply PL    [.04,.12    
  Flood et al. (2004) Household Income Survey (1993), aged 18–64 D TU, R; stigma of W Own calc. .12   0   −.017 −.003
  Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, Income Distribution Survey, 1999 D TU, R FASIT .18 .15 .06 0   
Switzerland Gerfin and Leu (2003) Swiss Income and Expenditure Survey (1998) D Quadratic utility, random preferences Tax model for Basel-Stadt .56 .36 .03 .01 −.06/ −.04 −.001/0
UK Arellano and Meghir (1992) British FES and LFS (1983), aged 20–59, with pre-school children (upper bound for all children) C SL + FC, search costs, endogenous wage and unearned income (IV) PL [.29,.71]    [ −.13, −.40]  
  Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) British General Household Survey (1974), aged <60 C CES utility-based labor supply, R PL [.62–2.03] 1.41    −.2/ −.14  
  Blundell and Walker (1986) FES (1980), all employed, aged 18–59 C Gorman polar form and translog hours, R PL    .024    −.287
  Blundell et al. (1987) FES (1981), aged 16–60 T/H Non-linear labor supply, unemployment risk Own calc.   [.0,.408]     
  Blundell et al. (1998) FES (1978–1992), 20–50, young children (lower bound if no child) C Generalized LES, R PL [.13,.37]b    [ −.19, 0]b  
  Blundell et al. (2000) Family Resources Survey (1994–1996) D QU + FC, R, W TAXBEN [.11–.17]      
  1. Data: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS), EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). For Germany: West (W), East (E). Model: C = continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981type); T = tobit model; D = discrete-choice model (van Soest 1995type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities vary across individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment). Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL), or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU), or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well additional flexibility, either through fixed costs (FC) or part-time dummies (PTD). Models are male-chauvinistic (M) or account for joint decision in couples (J). Welfare program participation (W). Childcare costs (CC). Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); non-convexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known. Elasticities: brackets indicate the range of values for all specifications (or the confidence interval when available). bindicates that the range also includes values for different age and number of children. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in employment rate in % points, except when indicated by a(in that case, % increase in employment rate). For Spain, several additional references are cited in García and Suárez (2003) which point to similar elasticities as in the basic model in this study