Matching strategies of teachers and schools in general equilibrium

Table 8 Policy simulation results with utility of mid-experience teachers at bad schools increased by 20%

Simulation results							Differences (Simulation results - base case)
	Mkt Entry	Search Pr. \(\left ({\gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\right)\)		Match Pr. \(\left ({P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\right)\)		N	Δ Mkt Entry	\({\Delta \gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\)		\({\Delta P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\)		Δ % N
		Bad sch	Good sch	Bad sch	Good sch			Bad sch	Good sch	Bad sch	Good sch
Low/bad	0.444	0.185	0.815	0.484	0.370	524.7	-0.037	0.073	-0.073	-0.052	0.023	0.055
Mid/bad	0.341	0.199	0.801	0.670	0.517	711.7	-0.103	0.075	-0.075	-0.031	0.048	0.066
High/bad	0.257	0.131	0.869	0.803	0.529	437.5	-0.073	0.018	-0.018	0.009	0.038	0.014
Low/good	0.357	0.433	0.567	0.366	0.626	2238.3	0.022	0.067	-0.067	-0.022	0.020	-0.022
Mid/good	0.341	0.210	0.790	0.542	0.633	3791.3	0.013	0.021	-0.021	-0.011	0.018	-0.012
High/good	0.239	0.050	0.950	0.683	0.648	3692.5	0.015	-0.017	0.017	0.033	0.005	-0.002

‘Mkt Entry’ is the likelihood of a teacher type j,k ^o deciding to enter the transfer market. ‘Search Pr. \(\boldsymbol {\left (\gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}\right)}\)’ is the directed search probabilities of a representative teacher of type j,k ^o toward a school type k, conditional on deciding the enter the transfer market. ‘Match Pr. \(\boldsymbol {\left (P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}\right)}\)’ is the probability of a teacher of type j,k ^o successfully matching with a school type k, conditional on searching in that market.