Matching strategies of teachers and schools in general equilibrium

Table 7 Policy simulation results with vacancies at good schools reduced by 15%

Simulation results							Differences (Simulation results - base case)
	Mkt entry	Search Pr. \(\left ({\gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\right)\)		Match Pr. \(\left ({P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\right)\)		N	Δ Mkt entry	\({\Delta \gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\)		\({\Delta P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}}\)		Δ % N
		Bad sch	Good sch	Bad sch	Good sch			Bad sch	Good sch	Bad sch	Good sch
Low/bad	0.396	0.166	0.834	0.483	0.353	537.7	-0.084	0.055	-0.055	-0.053	0.005	0.081
Mid/bad	0.437	0.181	0.820	0.656	0.486	662.8	-0.007	0.057	-0.057	-0.045	0.017	-0.007
High/bad	0.259	0.140	0.860	0.779	0.512	443.8	-0.071	0.027	-0.027	-0.016	0.021	0.029
Low/good	0.341	0.466	0.534	0.370	0.617	2225.3	0.006	0.100	-0.100	-0.018	0.010	-0.028
Mid/good	0.289	0.207	0.793	0.527	0.610	3840.2	-0.039	0.018	-0.018	-0.025	-0.005	0.001
High/good	0.213	0.070	0.930	0.630	0.636	3686.2	-0.011	0.003	-0.003	-0.020	-0.007	-0.003

‘Mkt Entry’ is the likelihood of a teacher type j,k ^o deciding to enter the transfer market. ‘Search Pr. \(\boldsymbol {\left (\gamma _{j,k^{o}}^{k}\right)}\)’ is the directed search probabilities of a representative teacher of type j,k ^o toward a school type k, conditional on deciding the enter the transfer market. ‘Match Pr. \(\boldsymbol {\left (P_{j,k^{o}}^{k}\right)}\)’ is the probability of a teacher of type j,k ^o successfully matching with a school type k, conditional on searching in that market.