Matching strategies of teachers and schools in general equilibrium

Table 6 Search/Match probabilities (school side): \(\boldsymbol {\gamma _{k}^{j,k^{o}}}\) and \(\boldsymbol {P_{k}^{j,k^{o}}}\)

School type ( k )	Search probabilities \(\left ({\gamma _{k}^{j,k^{o}}}\right)\)
	Low, bad	Mid, bad	High, bad	Low, good	Mid, good	High, good
Bad schl.	0.0331	0.0853	0.1191	0.1967	0.3599	0.2060
Good schl.	0.0175	0.0427	0.0567	0.1325	0.3050	0.4456
	Match probabilities \(\left ({P_{k}^{j,k^{o}}}\right)\)
	Low, bad	Mid, bad	High, bad	Low, good	Mid, good	High, good
Bad schl.	0.3991	0.3050	0.2692	0.5521	0.3876	0.3290
Good schl.	0.6161	0.4568	0.4353	0.3529	0.3477	0.3329

Estimated probability of a k-type school searching for a j,k ^o-type teacher \(\boldsymbol {\left (\gamma _{k}^{j,k^{o}}\right)}\), and conditional on searching for a j,k ^o-type teacher, estimated probability of matching \(\boldsymbol {\left (P_{k}^{j,k^{o}}\right)}\).