The levelling effect of product market competition on gender wage discrimination

Table 4 Wage regressions (full sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	OLS	Plant–sex fixed effects	Match fixed effects
Strong product market competition	−0.0112	−0.0082**	−0.0094*
	(0.0068)	(0.0041)	(0.0049)
Female × strong product market competition	0.0015	0.0019	0.0016
	(0.0062)	(0.0033)	(0.0039)
Female	−0.1460***
	(0.0032)
Observations	1,545,787

Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. The regressand is the log gross daily wage. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level. In Model 1, additional regressors are potential experience and tenure (linearly and squared), dummy variables for joining a plant before 1975, five levels of education, non-German nationality, the shares of female and low-skilled workers in the plant’s workforce, log plant size and its square, dummies for works council existence, a collective agreement at either firm level or sector level, exporting activity, new production technology, plant location in a rural area, one-digit industry, three-digit occupation, and year of observation. Model 2 additionally includes plant–sex fixed effects, whereas Model 3 includes match fixed effects. All regressors are centred around their sample averages and also interacted with the female dummy.